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JOHN E. THORSON*

Water Marketing in Big Sky
Country: An Interim Assessment
ABSTRACT
Water marketing has received the most attention and is most active
in the Southwest. Yet, in the Northern Rockies, Montana is experimenting with methods to improve the transferabilityand marketability
of water. The 1985 Montana Legislature enacted major legislation
that provides the framework for the marketing of water by private
water users, the state, and Indian tribes. Water marketing pursuant
to the legislation has been hampered by a depressed regional'economy and legal uncertainties. In this review of water marketing in
the "Big Sky" state, Montana lawyer John Thorson provides an
assessment of the difficulties of modifying the West's water law and
institutions.

INTRODUCTION
Water marketing has three dimensions in Big Sky Montana. The first
emphasizes the allocation of water on a subregional or regional basis.
The second involves water allocation on a local basis-that is, within
water basins or sub-basins. The third dimension concerns the marketing
of reserved Indian water rights.
In the realm of regional marketing, the state has established reasonably
consistent and innovative public policies to guide water sales transactions.
The problem: no buyers. At the local level, where there are modest but
growing opportunities for water sales, public policies are immature-if
not in disarray. Concerning the marketing of Indian water rights, the state
and one of its reservations have entered into a historic agreement; but
the authority of the Indian tribes under federal law to market their water
is still in question.
This paper examines Montana's water marketing policies at each of
these three levels. The context in which these policies developed is explained. The important features of Montana's water marketing system
are reviewed. The paper concludes discussing the major shortcomings
that have developed in each of these marketing areas.
*Mr. Thorson is a member of the law firm of Doney & Thorson, Helena, Montana, where he
specializes in water law. He received his bachelor's degree from the University of New Mexico and
his law degree from the University of California, Berkeley, where he was note and comment editor
of the California Law Review. He is a member of the California, Montana, and New Mexico bars.
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I. ADVENT OF WATER MARKETING IN MONTANA
The fear of water marketing was, ironically, the basis for Montana
accepting marketing as an important means for protecting the state's water
resources. During the energy boom of the 1970's and early 1980's, Montanans worried that portions of their state would become Owens Valleys'
to massive coal plants and thirsty new cities. One symbol embodied these
fears of devastation and ruin: coal slurry pipelines. A ban on coal slurry
pipelines using water was enacted in 1979.2 The state also had a ban on
the exportation of water out-of-state. 3
By 1985, Montana decisionmakers began to appreciate three facts that
ultimately led them to acquiesce in, if not embrace water marketing: (I)
many water marketing opportunities already existed under law; (2) water
marketing might increase the state's ability to profit from, as well as
control and condition large water uses; and (3) water marketing as a
con'cession to a tribe was useful in negotiating Indian water rights.
An examination of existing opportunities for the purchase of water led
decisionmakers to understand that water marketing was not the radical
notion it seemed to be. As indicated in Table I, which was prepared for
the legislature at the time, water could be purchased from numerous
sellers: federal and state agencies, private parties, and possibly Indian
tribes.
Legislators were also influenced by the "market participant" concept
that had been developed somewhat obliquely by the United States Supreme Court. Under a line of cases, the Court has allowed states, when
they act as "market participants," to discriminate in the purchase and
sale of goods in a fashion that would otherwise violate the dormant
interstate commerce clause. The theory was used by the Supreme Court
to uphold a Maryland law which discriminated against out-of-state scrap
dealers. Justice Powell wrote: "Nothing in the purposes animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor
its own citizens over others." 4 In Reeves v. Stake," the Court upheld a
South Dakota statute that authorized a state-owned cement plan to sell
only to state residents. In 1984, the Court, while striking down an Alaskan
statute requiring instate first processing of state-owned timber, seemed
I. With the construction of a pipeline, Owens Valley, California, fell victim to Los Angeles' thirst
for water. The incident is dramatically portrayed in the popular movie "Chinatown." For excellent
summaries of this history, see W. KAHRL, WATER AND POWER (1982) and M. REISNER, CADILLAC
DESERT (1986).
2. 1979 Mont. Laws 552, § 2, repealed by 1985 Mont. Laws 573, § 24.
3. 1921 Mont. Laws 220, § I, repealed by 1985 Mont. Laws 573, §23.
4. Hughes v. Alexander Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
5. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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TABLE 1
Possibilities for Water Sales in Montana

(As of 1984)
STATE JURISDISCTION?

WHO SELLS?

CONSIDERATION PAID
TO WHOM?

Fort Peck Reservoira

Option to state

Eqfually to state
Whether state
etederal
overn- sells or not
ment
if so d by

Yellwtail, Tiber, Canyon Ferryb

Same

Same

Same

Other reservoirs (Hungry Horse,
(Clark Canyon, Gibson

Federal government
Federal government

To federal
government
To federal
government

Probablec

INTERESTED PARTY

Approaches federal government for
industrial water from

state

Approaches federal government for
water for other purposes

Probablec
Yes

Approaches state for water from state
reservoirs (for any beneficial use)

State government To state

Approaches private party for water for
any beneficial use

Private party

To private party

Cha e of use
revtew

Appropriates water in own name for any
beneficial use; perhaps later transfer of
use (including to an out-of-state location)

No sale; simply
application for
permit

None paid

Public interest

Indian tribe

Tribe

h

cnteria ; perhaps

change of use f or
MFSA5
Tribe

Probable jurisdiction over offreservation movement or use of water
(if otherwise lawful)

Notes:
a Under Memorandum of Agreement between the State of Montana and the US, Bureau of
Reclamation (1976).
b Under proposed Memorandum of Agreement between the State of Montana and the US. Bureau of
Reclamation (1984 draft).
c So long as state conditions do not defeat the primarp se of the federal projecL United States v.
California (New Mellones Dam), 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982).
d Mont. Code An. § 85-2-402 (1983).
e Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-311 (1983).
f Mont Code Ann. § 85-2402 (1983).
Ma*or Facility Siting Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 75-20-101 to -1205 (1983).
nial marketing is probably subject to federal approval. 25 US.C. §§ 407,415 (1982).

to indicate that Alaska could choose the purchasers with whom it would
deal so long as the state did not attempt to restrict the post-purchase
behavior of the buyers. 6
6. South-Central Timber Dcv., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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Thus, if the state were to market water, it might be able to condition
water use in a way not available to it in its regulatory capacity. Also,
payments to the state could be extracted for large water uses.7

At the same time the legislature was considering water marketing issues
in its 1985 session, the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact
Commission' and the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Peck
Reservation were completing a compact quantifying the tribes' reserved
water rights. Authorization for the tribes to market their water became
an important discussion point in the last stages of the negotiations.
11. THE WATER MARKETING SYSTEM
CREATED BY THE 1985 LEGISLATURE
The 1985 Montana Legislature was the most active legislature on water
issues since the original Water Use Act was passed in 1973. The legislature
took actions which affected water marketing at the local and regional
levels and established a precedent for water marketing by Indian tribes.
A. Local Marketing
The fewest changes made in water marketing law were in local marketing, as Montana law already provided for the transfer and severance
of water rights through the administrative system. 9 The legislature did,
however, adopt increasingly stringent public interest criteria to govern
new appropriations and transfers of or changes in existing rights.'"
7. For excellent discussions of the "market participant" concept, see N.M. WATER RESOURCES
RESEARCH INST., STATE APPROPRIATION OF UNAPPROPRIATED GROUNDWATER: A STRATEGY FOR INSURING

NEW MEXICO A WATER FUTURE (1986); Rodgers, The Limits of State Activity in the Interstate Water
Market, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV 357 (1986).

8. The Commission represents the state in reserved water negotiations with Indian tribes and the

federal government. See

MONT. CODE ANN.

§2-15-212 (1987).

9. Id. § 85-2-403.
10. The legislation, H.B. 680, 49th Leg. (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §85-2-311 (1983))
creates three levels of public interest criteria and a special set of "out-of-state" conservation criteria
for evaluating permit applications, change of appropriation applications, and reservation of water
applications.
When applying for new water permits,, potential appropriators now have to satisfy either "Level
I" or "Level 2" criteria, regardless of whether the water will be used in or out-of-state." Level I"
public interest criteria roughly parallel preexisting law. These criteria apply to appropriations of less
than 4000 ac-ft/yr and 5.5 cfs and require only the traditional examination of the potential effect of
a new water use on other appropriators in a basin (e.g., whether there will be adverse effect on prior
appropriators, whether the diversion will be properly constructed, whether the proposed use is
beneficial).
"Level 2" public interest criteria, applying to diversions in excess of 4000 ac-ft/yr and 5.5 cfs,
restate temporary criteria added in 1983. By permanently adopting these criteria, the legislature has
made clear that large diversions will be carefully evaluated on the basis of a broader, state-wide
public interest.
Drafters of the legislation (H.B. 680) were concerned that potential appropriators would seek to
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B. Regional Marketing
In the area of subregional or regional marketing, the legislature was
much more ambitious. It established a limited state water-leasing program
that involved a maximum of 50,000 acre-feet (ac-ft) of impounded water."
A lease from the state is now required to obtain water in any amount for

transport outside any one of five specified river basins or for uses of water
in excess of 4000 acre-feet/year (ac-ft/yr) and 5.5 cubic feet per second

(cfs).' 2 Lesser amounts of water can also be leased.
As water is leased, it is appropriated in the name of the state, and a
certificate is issued to the state department of natural resources and conservation.' 3 If lease applications exceed 50,000 ac-ft/yr of water, the
department must return to the legislature for additional leasing authority. 4
Leases are limited to 50 years but can be renewed for up to an additional
50 years. ' Leases must be approved by the board of natural resources
and conservation. 6
The source of water for the leasing program is impounded water from
any reservoir within Montana.' 7 Water cannot be leased from a reservoir
in a basin for which a pending or final decree under the statewide general
stream adjudication program has not been issued.'" This restriction does
avoid the public interest criteria and the new state water leasing program (see next section on
Regional Marketing) by acquiring existing rights and securing a change in type of use, place of use,
or place of diversion from the department. H.B. 680 prevents this by incorporating the "Level I"
and "Level 2" standards in a substantially revised "change in appropriation rights" section. A
specialized requirement ("Level 3") is set forth for change applications that would result in water
in excess of 4000 ac-ftlyr and 5.5 cfs being consumed: these change applications must be approved
by the legislature. For the same reasons, certain of the public interest criteria have been added to
the water reservations procedures. While it has not been used for this purpose, it is arguable that
the reservation of water system allows water to be reserved for existing as well as future beneficial
uses. Again, the drafters were concerned that potential water users would attempt to avoid the leasing
program and the public interest criteria by applying for water under this provision.
The legislature also provided additional public interest criteria to provide an especially careful
review of applications to move water out-of-siate. These conservation criteria were designed to
provide the state with constitutionally permissible means to regulate and review out-of-state movement
of water. They stem from the opportunity left by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska
ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), for states to prefer their own citizens for water if necessary
for "health and safety" purposes. In fashioning these water conservation criteria, Montana has
attempted to rely upon and learn from New Mexico's recent experiences in the City of El Paso v.
Reynolds litigation, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983); 597 F Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984). The
Montana drafters believe that their revisions of the New Mexico scheme, coupled with Montana's
overall pattern of public interest criteria, results in a constitutionally defensible limitation on the
exportation of water from the state.
11. MONT. CODE ANN. §85-2-141 (1987).
12. Id. §85-2-301.
13. Id.
14. ld. § 85-2-141(4).
15. Id. §85-2-141(5).
16. Id. §85-2-141(1).
17. Id. §85-2-141(3).
18. Id. §85-2-141(3)(a).
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not apply to federal reservoirs for which the state has a water purchase
and revenue sharing agreement with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 19
Water is leased through bilateral negotiations.On receipt of an application to lease water, the department evaluates the proposal with reference
to statutory public interest criteria.2' The department can require that 25
percent of the capacity of a proposed project be set aside for municipal
and rural purposes (upon payment by the municipal or rural government
of the costs of the tie-in). 2 All other terms and conditions are determined
through negotiations.22
The legislature was concerned about the impacts of water marketing
on agriculture. For this reason, the legislation gives specific authority to
the department to use differential pricing, and the explicit legislative intent
is that agriculture leasing is to be preferred.23 The proceeds of the leasing
program go to the state general fund.
C. Tribal Marketing
Ratification of the Fort Peck-Montana Compact24 by the Montana Legislature in the spring of 1985 represented the largest Indian water rights
settlement in history. 2 The tribes are given the annual right to divert from
the Missouri River, the tributaries that flow through or are adjacent to
the reservation, and groundwater the lesser of: (1) 1,050,472 ac-ft/yr of
water, or (2) the amount of water necessary to supply a consumptive use
of 525,236 ac-ft/yr.
Under the Compact, water can be transferred to non-Indians, either
on- or off-reservation, but the transfer can only be of the right to use the
water-the tribes may not permanently alienate the water awarded under
the Compact. The tribes are guaranteed the right to transfer up to 50,000
ac-ft/yr for off-reservation consumptive uses. This amount can be increased in the event the state increases its own marketing authority. The
Compact asks Congress to specifically ratify tribal authority to market
water.
II!. ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
The jury is still out on the effectiveness of Montana's water policy.

19. Id. §85-2-141(3)(b) & (c).

20. Id. § 85-2-311.,
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
It was

Id. §85-2-141(8).
Id.
Statement of Intent, H.B. 680, 49th Leg., 1985 Mont. Laws 573.
MONT. CODE ANN. §85-20-201 (1987).
The Compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior and the U.S. Attorney General.
not submitted to Congress for ratification.
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The following are some comments on the status of the marketing program
in each of the three areas.
A. Regional Marketing
The reasons for Montana's regional water marketing program are explicit. Foremost, it provides the opportunity for the state, through application of the market participation theory, to condition the interstate movement
of water so as to protect environmental values and other state policies.
The water marketing program also ensures that the state receives fair
consideration for the use of large amounts of water. Through a leasing
program, the legislature has provided a means for the state to condition
leases on the basis of public interest criteria and periodically review the
uses of the leased water.
Thus, Montana has an adequate superstructure in place to respond to
large-scale pressures on the state's water resources-those brought about
by energy development or proposals for interstate transfers. Other elements of this water protection strategy include the reservation of waters
on major rivers for instream flows and future uses, public interest criteria
governing new appropriations and changes in water rights, water planning, and the public trust doctrine.
Problems remain, however, which threaten the effectiveness of this
regional marketing and protection strategy. 'The state water marketing
program limits leases from reservoirs, the larger ones of which are federal.
Presently, federal reclamation law limits the marketing of water supplied
by federal reclamation projects by limiting the amount of "profit" that
can be earned by the transferor. A recent decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court in ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri,26 concerning the authority of
the Bureau of Reclamation to approve the sale of water from the Oahe
Reservoir in North Dakota to the ETSI coal slurry pipeline consortium,
eliminates the ability of the Bureau to market surplus water from mainstem
dams in the Missouri River basin. As the federal water agencies revise
their water marketing policies, they may make inroads in the ability of
the states either to profit from or protect the water of the state. If the
Corps or Bureau actively seek to market their surplus water, they will be
either competitors or price-establishing wholesalers for states.
Large hydro-generation rights on the Clark Fork River system in the
western part of Montana will preclude any large state water leasing proposals. On the eastern side of the state, the absence of an interstate
apportionment on the Missouri River system also constrains water marketing. Without a decree or compact, any large-scale marketing proposal
will no doubt be greeted with objections from lower basin states.
26. 108 S.Ct, 805 (1988).
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B. Local Marketing
It is at the local level that water marketing faces its greatest difficulties.
Montana has yet to adopt a comprehensive and explicit policy for basin
or sub-basin water marketing. The 1985 legislature, by establishing public
interest permit and transfer criteria, attempted to fuse the broader public
interest and the marketplace. Yet, numerous barriers still prevent the
expeditious transfer of water to more efficient and higher value uses.
While water rights can be transferred and severed from the land, such
transactions must be approved by the department of natural resources and
conservation in its application of public interest criteria. 7 While the state's
water marketing program nominally promotes greater water use efficiency
by emphasizing the economic value of water, many other features of the
state's water policy, such as an ambitious water development program,
undermine water use efficiency.
The lack of physical plumbing in the state also restrains local water
marketing. During the 1977 California drought, that state's elaborate
system of canals allowed water to be moved virtually anywhere in the
state. Montana, a state nearly two-thirds the size of California, does not
begin to have that type of plumbing system. Thus, it remains difficult to
move water to places of demand.
The most significant barrier to local water marketing, however, is the
lack of water rights quantification. Montana is attempting to complete a
statewide water adjudication process; but even when completed (hopefully
in the 1990's), most individual rights will not be quantified as to their
consumptive amount. Thus, every water transfer proceeding will end up
requantifying the amount that can be transferred without harm to other
appropriators. Some basin wide procedure must be devised to calculate
these consumptive shares.
Other uncertainties detract from the title of many water rights. The
public trust doctrine,28 not yet applied to appropriated water in Montana,
has reminded the state of its obligation, as steward of the water resource,
to prevent harmful water uses. The waste and reasonable use provisions
of law will be more frequently enforced.
All these uncertainties increase the transaction costs of obtaining water
27. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402 (1987).
28. The public trust doctrine, having its origins in Roman and Anglo-Saxon law, holds that the
sovereign has a fiduciary obligation in the management of important public resources. The landmark
American case is Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The doctrine has been
increasingly applied to require state protection of public and environmental values when water is
used by private appropriators. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 658
P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Montana Coalition for Stream
Access v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163 (1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v.
Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d 1088 (1984).

Spring 19891

WATER MARKETING: AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT

rights transfers. Many transfer approvals become de novo proceedings
on these issues. For instance, the author represents a party seeking to
purchase and transfer a modest irrigation water right in a partially adjudicated basin. Seven parties filed objections, and a two-day hearing
took place almost one year after the initial application. The hearing examiner's decision was issued six months later, and we now await final
arguments before the department. Two irrigation seasons have already
passed, and we still do not know if this water rights transfer will be
approved.
Like many other western states, Montana fails to provide any incentive
for greater water efficiency. Title to salvage rights is uncertain, and the
state should consider legislation allowing the salvager to expand acreage
or to sell his salvaged water.
To better understand the fundamental questions that are raised in selling
water rights in Montana, let me analogize to the sale of a car. I advertise
to sell my classic 1957 Oldsmobile 98. While the first browsers are
impressed with its apparent immaculate appearance, soon they ask hard
questions. "I understand that you don't really own this car, that it is just
on loan from the state?" "I heard that this isn't really an original 1957
but a clever replica manufactured about 1977." Or, "I've heard that this
is really a taxi cab owned by the taxi company, available for everyone
to use." Or, "I've heard that this car must be made available at any time,
and for free, to members of the wilderness club." "How do I know it
will run? I understand that you haven't used the car for ten years."
An even less friendly group arrives. Some neighbors are astonished
that 1 would even consider selling the car-as they claim to own the
wheels and transmission. An agent for the federal government claims
that, since the car has been driven most often on interstate highways,
that the Department of Transportation actually owns it. A lawyer serves
me papers alleging that I had wrongfully converted the car from the
rightful owners-a nearby Indian tribe. The marketability of my Olds 98
has dramatically diminished. Potential buyers have left by the back door.
C. Tribal Water Marketing
Execution of the Montana-Fort Peck Compact29 is a historic benchmark
in the development of western water law. It marks the first time that a
tribe and a state have been able to quantify the Indian reserved right
without federal dollars and a minimum of federal participation. The water
marketing provisions of that Compact will be the model for other compacts
in Montana and probably throughout the West.
29. See supra note 24.
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Yet, ambiguity over the water marketing provisions of the agreement
will remain until Congress affirms that tribes can at least lease and transfer
their reserved water rights on- or off-reservation. The Fort Peck Compact
calls upon Congress to approve legislation specifically recognizing the
ability of the tribes to market their water,"' but although four years have
passed, legislation has not been introduced.
IV. CONCLUSION
Convincing and well-developed theories have been propounded in support of greater water efficiency and water marketing in the West. Many
states are adopting legislation and regulations to promote this emphasis.
Clever brokers and lawyers have been able to make water marketing work
in spite of restrictive and cumbersome rules.
Yet, the experiences in Montana indicate that a large gulf exists between
theory and practice. Western water allocation institutions are changing,
but they are complex and sometimes rigid. A greater emphasis on economic efficiency and value in the allocation must be harmonized with
other public policies, such as the emphasis on public rights, which move
in an entirely different direction. Harmony will be achieved, if at all,
only after policymakers rethink the purposes of their water management
systems and practitioners understand those purposes and accept the means
to achieve them.

30, Id

